Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard and flexible technology

被引:0
|
作者
Quiggin, J [1 ]
Chambers, RG
机构
[1] Univ Queensland, Fac Business Econ & Law, Sch Econ, St Lucia, Qld 4072, Australia
[2] Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD 20742 USA
[3] Univ Western Australia, Nedlands, WA 6009, Australia
基金
澳大利亚研究理事会;
关键词
capital market equilibrium; moral hazard; flexible technology;
D O I
10.1016/j.jmateco.2005.08.008
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
(Magill, M., Quinzii, M., 2002. Capital market equilibrium with moral hazard. Journal of Mathematical Economics 38, 149-190) showed that, in a stockmarket economy with private information, the moral hazard problem may be resolved provided that a spanning overlap condition is satisfed. This result depends on the assumption that the technology is given by a stochastic production function with a single scalar input. The object of the present paper is to extend the analysis of Magill and Quinzii to the case of multiple inputs. We show that their main result extends to this general case if and only if, for each firm, the number of linearly independent combinations of securities having payoffs correlated with, but not dependent on, the firms output is equal to the number of degrees of freedom in the firm's production technology. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码:358 / 363
页数:6
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