The simple geometry of perfect information games

被引：3
|
作者：
Demichelis, S [1 ]
Ritzberger, K
Swinkels, JM
机构：
[1] Univ Pavia, Dipartimento Matemat, I-27100 Pavia, Italy
[2] Inst Adv Studies, Dept Econ & Finance, A-1060 Vienna, Austria
[3] Washington Univ St Louis, John M Olin Sch Business, St Louis, MO 63005 USA
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY | 2004年 / 32卷 / 03期
关键词：
extensive form games; perfect information; subgame perfection;
D O I：
10.1007/s001820400169
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Perfect information games have a particularly simple structure of equilibria in the associated normal form. For generic such games each of the finitely many connected components of Nash equilibria is contractible. For every perfect information game there is a unique connected and contractible component of subgame perfect equilibria. Finally, the graph of the subgame perfect equilibrium correspondence, after a very mild deformation, looks like the space of perfect information extensive form games.
引用
收藏
页码：315 / 338
页数：24
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