The power indices for multi-choice multi-valued games

被引:2
|
作者
Hsiao, C [1 ]
机构
[1] Soochow Univ, Dept Math, Taipei 111, Taiwan
来源
TAIWANESE JOURNAL OF MATHEMATICS | 2004年 / 8卷 / 02期
关键词
multi-valued multi-choice game; multi-choice shapley value; power indices;
D O I
10.11650/twjm/1500407627
中图分类号
O1 [数学];
学科分类号
0701 ; 070101 ;
摘要
We extend the simple multi-choice game to a multi-valued multi-choice game. We prove that the Shapley value for multi-valued multi-choice games is unique and coincides with the Shapley value for multi-choice cooperative games.
引用
收藏
页码:259 / 270
页数:12
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