Rent-sharing and Collective Bargaining Coverage: Evidence from Linked Employer-Employee Data

被引:67
|
作者
Guertzgen, Nicole [1 ]
机构
[1] Ctr European Econ Res, D-68131 Mannheim, Germany
来源
SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 111卷 / 02期
关键词
Rent-sharing; unions; linked employer-employee data; J31; J51; C23; WAGE DIFFERENTIALS; WORKS COUNCILS; UNEMPLOYMENT; INDUSTRY; FIRM; PRODUCTIVITY; EQUILIBRIUM; INSURANCE; CONTRACTS; GERMANY;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-9442.2009.01566.x
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Using a linked employer-employee dataset, this paper analyses the relationship between firm profitability and wages. Particular emphasis is given to the question of whether the sensitivity of wages to firm-specific rents varies with collective bargaining coverage. To address this issue, we distinguish sector- and firm-specific wage agreements and wage determination without any bargaining coverage. Our findings indicate that individual wages are positively related to firm-specific quasi-rents in the non-union sector and under firm-specific contracts. Industry-wide wage contracts, however, are associated with a significantly lower responsiveness of wages to firm-level profitability.
引用
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页码:323 / 349
页数:27
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