A New Method for Equilibrium Selection in Financial Transmission Right's Auctions

被引：0
|
作者：
Khazaei, Hossein [1 ]
Sabounchi, Moein [2 ]
机构：
[1] Amirkabir Univ Technol, Dept Elect Engn, Tehran, Iran
[2] Ferdowsi Univ Mashhad, Dept Elect Engn, Mashhad, Iran
来源：
2014 6th IEEE Power India International Conference (PIICON) | 2014年
关键词：
Terms Multiple equilibria; equilibrium selection; game theory; financial transmission right; GAMES;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TE [石油、天然气工业]; TK [能源与动力工程];
学科分类号：
0807 ; 0820 ;
摘要：
Existence of Multiple equilibria in electricity markets, especially financial transmission right (FTR) auctions is the main cause of ambiguity in the markets' outcomes because in such situations, players do not have an efficient tool to deal with. In this paper, we introduce a new criterion for equilibrium selection in infinite games based on two new concepts of 'value' and 'chance'. These two are dependent concepts which are chosen carefully to reflect the role of expected payoff and risk of one strategy in measuring the players' incentives. The aforementioned method is then, applied on a FTR auction with two players on a three node test system.
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页数：6
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