Does Client Importance Affect Auditor Independence at the Office Level? Empirical Evidence from Going-Concern Opinions

This paper investigates whether client importance affects auditor independence within the local offices of audit firms. Client importance is measured as the proportion of audit fees, nonaudit service fees, or total fees that a distressed, public client contributes to the total public client revenue earned by the individual audit offices. Auditor independence is measured as the auditor's propensity to issue a going-concern opinion. The paper focuses on changes in the relation between fee ratios and auditor reporting decisions from the period before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) (2001) to the post-SOX (2003) period. In the preSOX period, I do not find statistically significant association between any of the fee ratios and the auditor's propensity to issue a going-concern opinion. However, in the post-SOX period, I find evidence that higher audit fee and total fee ratios are positively associated with the auditor's propensity to issue a going-concern opinion. That is. post-SOX, relatively more important clients are more likely to receive a going-concern opinion. These results allay concerns that auditor independence is compromised for significant clients.