Quality certification standards in competitive markets: When consumers and producers (dis)agree

被引:5
|
作者
Lapan, Harvey [1 ]
Moschini, GianCarlo [1 ]
机构
[1] Iowa State Univ, Dept Econ, Ames, IA 50011 USA
关键词
Comparative statics; Log-concavity; Minimum quality standards; Quality certification; Vertical product differentiation; MONOPOLY; LEMONS;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2009.05.001
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A quality certification standard in a competitive setting can improve welfare but may affect consumers and producers differently. In a competitive model with quality preferences of the vertical product differentiation type, we find that producers prefer a higher (lower) quality standard than consumers if individual demand functions are log-convex (log-concave). (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:144 / 147
页数:4
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