The effects of tariffs on coalition formation in a dynamic global warming game

被引:64
作者
Lessmann, Kai [1 ]
Marschinski, Robert [1 ]
Edenhofer, Ottmar [1 ]
机构
[1] Potsdam Inst Climate Impact Res, D-14412 Potsdam, Germany
关键词
Climate change; Self-enforcing international environmental agreements; Trade sanctions; Coalition stability; International cooperation; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; TECHNOLOGICAL-CHANGE; CLIMATE-CHANGE; KYOTO PROTOCOL; ISSUE LINKAGE; MODEL; TRADE; COOPERATION; STRATEGIES; PROTECTION;
D O I
10.1016/j.econmod.2009.01.005
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
The prospects for cooperation on climate protection beyond 2012 are currently uncertain. Thus policy instruments which foster participation in International Environmental Agreements (IEA) are in demand. Among the instruments under discussion are trade sanctions. Multi-region optimal growth models are a state of the art tool for integrated assessment, but introducing trade sanctions distorts the competitive equilibrium, making it difficult to compute numerically. We introduce trade and trade sanctions into a model of coalition stability to assess the potential of trade sanctions to support an IEA. Trade is modeled by having all countries produce a generic output good, but adopting national product differentiation (Armington assumption). Coalitions are free to impose tariffs on imports from non-cooperating countries. We solve the model numerically using a refined version of Negishi's [Negishi,T., 1960. Welfare economics and existence of an equilibrium fora competitive economy. Metroeconomica 12, 92-97] basic algorithm. We then apply the model to analyze the influence of tariffs on international cooperation. The model suggests that there is indeed a significant potential to raise participation through trade sanctions, even when goods from different countries are nearly perfect substitutes. Furthermore we investigate the effect of trade sanctions on global welfare, environmental effectiveness, and the credibility of the tariff mechanism. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:641 / 649
页数:9
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