How tournament incentives affect asset markets: A comparison between winner-take-all tournaments and elimination contests

被引：10

作者：

Fang, Dawei ^{[1
]}

Holmen, Martin ^{[1
]}

Kleinlercher, Daniel ^{[2
]}

Kirchler, Michael ^{[1
,2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Gothenburg, Dept Econ, Ctr Finance, Vasagatan 1, S-40530 Gothenburg, Sweden

[2] Univ Innsbruck, Dept Banking & Finance, Univ Str 5, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL | 2017年 / 75卷

基金：

瑞典研究理事会; 奥地利科学基金会;

关键词：

Tournament incentives; Investment behavior; Market efficiency; Experimental finance; RISK-TAKING; MUTUAL FUNDS; PERFORMANCE; SELECTION; MATTERS; CHOICE; IMPACT;

D O I：

10.1016/j.jedc.2016.11.006

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We investigate the impact of investment managers' tournament incentives on investment strategies and market efficiency, distinguishing between winner-take-all tournaments (WTA), where a minority wins, and elimination contests (EC), where a majority wins. Theoretically, we show that investment managers play heterogeneous strategies in WTA and homogeneous strategies in EC, and markets are more prone to mispricing in WTA than in EC. Experimentally, we find that investment managers play more heterogeneous strategies in WTA than in EC, but this does not trigger significant differences in prices. Moreover, prices in WTA and EC do not differ significantly from markets composed of linearly incentivized subjects. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1 / 27

页数：27