Higher-order risk vulnerability

被引:3
|
作者
Huang, James [1 ]
Stapleton, Richard [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Lancaster, Sch Management, Lancaster LA1 4YX, England
[2] Manchester Business Sch, Crawford House,Oxford Rd, Manchester M13 9PL, Lancs, England
关键词
Background risk; Downside risk aversion; Downside risk vulnerability; Higher-order risk vulnerability; DOWNSIDE RISK; BACKGROUND RISK; SKEWNESS PREFERENCE; AVERSION; PRUDENCE; DEMAND;
D O I
10.1007/s00199-015-0935-2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We add an independent unfair background risk to higher-order risk-taking models in the current literature and examine its interaction with the main risk under consideration. Parallel to the well-known concept of risk vulnerability, which is defined by Gollier and Pratt (Econometrica 64: 1109-1123, 1996), an agent is said to have a type of higher-order risk vulnerability if adding an independent unfair background risk to wealth raises his level of this type of higher-order risk aversion. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for all types of higher-order risk vulnerabilities and explain their behavioral implications. We find that as in the case of risk vulnerability, all familiar HARA utility functions have all types of higher-order risk vulnerabilities except for a type of third-order risk vulnerability corresponding to a downside risk aversion measure called the Schwarzian derivative.
引用
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页码:387 / 406
页数:20
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