Pricing, collection, and effort decisions with coordination contracts in a fuzzy, three-level closed-loop supply chain

In this paper, a fuzzy, closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), with one manufacturer, one retailer and one collector, is investigated. The optimal decision problem is analyzed based on a fuzzy price and sales effort dependent demand to evaluate how members decide wholesale price, collection rate, retail price, and sales effort under different decision-making structures. Six game theory models are established and optimal solutions are extracted and compared by applying game and fuzzy theories. According to the results, collaboration between a manufacturer and retailer is favorable for both customers and the chain as a whole; the most effective model for collecting used products is collaboration between the manufacturer and collector. Finally, a practical, new channel coordination scheme is explored to match the performance of a decentralized CLSC to that of a centralized CLSC. The results illustrate that the proposed contract can effectively coordinate decentralized CLSCs. It is also beneficial from both consumer and environmental perspectives. (C) 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.