One of the core issues where interpreters of Kant disagree concerns his alleged Noumenalism-the claim that the objects of our experience, which are in space and time, are underpinned by entities that are not spatio-temporal and that non-spatio-temporally cause our representations of empirical objects. Although there is much textual evidence in favour of Noumenalism, non-Noumenalists have also gathered a significant number of philosophical and exegetical challenges to such a reading of Kant. I present a novel way of understanding the Noumenalist view, which characterises the distinction between appearances and things in themselves as the distinction between referents and truthmakers. I show that, on this interpretation of Kant, the most pressing problems for the Noumenalist reading are primarily based on equivocations between features of reference and features of truthmaking.
机构:
Univ Western Australia, Sch Humanities, Philosophy, Perth, WA 6009, AustraliaUniv Western Australia, Sch Humanities, Philosophy, Perth, WA 6009, Australia