Mandatory shareholder approval of equity issuances varies across and within countries. When shareholders approve issuances, average announcement returns are positive. When managers issue stock without shareholder approval, returns are negative and 4% lower. The closer the vote is to the issuance or the greater is the required plurality, the higher are the returns for public offers, rights offers, and private placements. When shareholder approval is required, rights offers predominate. When managers may issue stock without shareholder approval, public offers predominate. These findings suggest that agency problems affect equity issuances and challenge existing adverse selection, market timing, and signaling explanations. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business & Management, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaHong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business & Management, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Chen, Kevin C. W.
Chen, Zhihong
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City Univ Hong Kong, Coll Business, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaHong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business & Management, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Chen, Zhihong
Wei, K. C. John
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Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business & Management, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaHong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business & Management, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
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Drexel Univ, Lebow Coll Business, Philadelphia, PA USAHong Kong Polytech Univ, Sch Accounting & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Choy, HiuLam
Gul, Ferdinand A.
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机构:Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Sch Accounting & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
Gul, Ferdinand A.
Yao, Jun
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Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Sch Accounting & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R ChinaHong Kong Polytech Univ, Sch Accounting & Finance, Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China