Equity issuances and agency costs: The telling story of shareholder approval around the world

被引:36
|
作者
Holderness, Clifford G. [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Royal Acad Belgium, European Corp Governance Inst, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium
[2] Boston Coll, Carroll Sch Management, 140 Commonwealth Ave, Chestnut Hill, MA 04627 USA
关键词
Equity issuances; Seasoned equity offerings (SEOs); Agency costs; Mandatory shareholder voting; Corporate governance; RIGHTS OFFERINGS; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; UNDERWRITER CERTIFICATION; OPERATING PERFORMANCE; INFORMATION-CONTENT; CORPORATE-FINANCE; FLOTATION METHODS; STOCK-MARKET; ISSUES; OWNERSHIP;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.06.006
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Mandatory shareholder approval of equity issuances varies across and within countries. When shareholders approve issuances, average announcement returns are positive. When managers issue stock without shareholder approval, returns are negative and 4% lower. The closer the vote is to the issuance or the greater is the required plurality, the higher are the returns for public offers, rights offers, and private placements. When shareholder approval is required, rights offers predominate. When managers may issue stock without shareholder approval, public offers predominate. These findings suggest that agency problems affect equity issuances and challenge existing adverse selection, market timing, and signaling explanations. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:415 / 439
页数:25
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