Agency, firm growth, and managerial turnover: A Chinese study

被引：5
|
作者：
Fu, Kangkang [2 ]
Kwok, Wing Chun [1 ]
Wong, George [3 ]
机构：
[1] Hang Seng Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[2] Hong Kong Baptist Univ, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[3] Hong Kong Polytech Univ, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
来源：
PACIFIC-BASIN FINANCE JOURNAL | 2020年 / 63卷
关键词：
Firm growth; Life-cycle; Managerial turnover; State-owned enterprises; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; PERFORMANCE; CEO;
D O I：
10.1016/j.pacfin.2020.101401
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
Consistent with the notions of growth-induced and disciplinary-induced CEO turnover, we find that the probability of CEO dismissal in the US and China is significantly higher for firms with better growth prospects or poorer past performance. Relative to the US, Chinese firms display a stronger incentive to replace their CEOs when better growth opportunities arise. We find weaker evidence for both growth- and disciplinary-induced CEO dismissal for Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
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页数：9
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