On the state of the union

被引:58
作者
Aiyagari, SR [1 ]
Greenwood, J
Guner, N
机构
[1] Univ Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
[2] Penn State Univ, University Pk, PA 16802 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1086/262117
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
An overlapping generations model of marriage and divorce is constructed to analyze family structure and intergenerational mobility. Agents differ by sex, marital status, and human capital. Single agents meet in a marriage market and decide whether to accept or reject proposals to wed. Married couples must decide whether to separate or not. Parents invest in their children depending on their wherewithal. A simulated version of die theoretical prototype can generate an equilibrium with a significant number of female-headed families and a high degree of persistence in income across generations. To illustrate the model's mechanics, the effects of two antipoverty policies, namely child support and welfare, are investigated.
引用
收藏
页码:213 / 244
页数:32
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