Biased principals as a discipline device

被引：6

作者：

Dewatripont, M

Tirole, J

机构：

[1] CERAS,PARIS,FRANCE

[2] IDEI,TOULOUSE,FRANCE

来源：

JAPAN AND THE WORLD ECONOMY | 1996年 / 8卷 / 02期

关键词：

multiple principals; equity; debt; budget constraints;

D O I：

10.1016/0922-1425(96)82497-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper rationalizes the existence of multiple, biased principals as a discipline device that induces agents to expend effort, Specifically, principals are given incentives that induce them to take actions that reward (punish) agents after good (bad) performance. This framework is illustrated in the case of corporations, which rely on equityholders and debtholders to keep management in check, and in the case of multiministry oversight of state-owned firms.

引用

页码：195 / 206

页数：12

共 13 条

[1] AN INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS APPROACH TO FINANCIAL CONTRACTING [J].