IS THE 50-STATE STRATEGY OPTIMAL?

被引:15
|
作者
Kovenock, Dan [1 ]
Roberson, Brian [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Iowa, Dept Econ, Tippie Coll Business, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA
[2] Miami Univ, Dept Econ, Richard T Farmer Sch Business, Oxford, OH 45056 USA
关键词
all-pay auction; dynamic contests; elections; political campaigns; war of attrition; DOLLAR AUCTION; REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS; INCUMBENCY ADVANTAGES; ELECTORAL-COLLEGE; MODEL; COMPETITION; ESCALATION; ALLOCATION; GAME; EQUILIBRIUM;
D O I
10.1177/0951629808100764
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
In 2005, the Democratic National Committee adopted the 50-state strategy in lieu of the strategy of focusing solely on battleground states. The rationale given for this move is that campaign expenditures are durable outlays that impact both current and future campaigns. This article investigates the optimality of the 50-state strategy in a simple dynamic game of campaign resource allocation in which expenditures act as a form of investment. Neither the 50-state nor the battleground-states strategy is likely to arise in equilibrium. Instead, parties employ a hybrid strategy in which non-battleground states are stochastically targeted.
引用
收藏
页码:213 / 236
页数:24
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