Permit Allocation Options: Auctioning or Grandfathering

被引：0
|
作者：
Yang, Ruigui [1 ]
Wang, Pingping [2 ]
机构：
[1] Jiangxi Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Art, Nanchang, Jiangxi, Peoples R China
[2] Jiangxi Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Informat Technol, Nanchang, Jiangxi, Peoples R China
来源：
2010 ASIA-PACIFIC POWER AND ENERGY ENGINEERING CONFERENCE (APPEEC) | 2010年
关键词：
permit allocation; auctioning; grandfathering; cost effectiveness; Kyoto protocol;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
TE [石油、天然气工业]; TK [能源与动力工程];
学科分类号：
0807 ; 0820 ;
摘要：
In discussions about the policy design of domestic emission trading, e. g., when implementing the Kyoto Protocol, the two permit allocation alternatives-auctioning and allocation gratis (grandfathering) -are often pitted against each other as representing utopian cost-effectiveness and political realism, respectively. In this note, an attempt is made to extract the main points of a comparison between the two options with respect to efficiency and distribution.
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页数：4
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