The Political Budget Cycle and Subnational Debt Expenditures in Federations: Panel Data Evidence from India

被引:20
|
作者
Saez, Lawrence [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ London, Sch Oriental & African Studies, London, England
关键词
MACROECONOMIC POLICY; FISCAL FEDERALISM; BUSINESS-CYCLE; GOVERNMENT; PERFORMANCE; PARTIES; ECONOMY; GROWTH; LIBERALIZATION; GLOBALIZATION;
D O I
10.1111/gove.12130
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
What political variables explain variations in subnational fiscal expenditures on interest payments on the debt? The author argues that the political budget cycle and center-right political party ideologyrather than the effective number of parties, alternation of power, ideological proximity between the central government and constituent units, or most forms of political party ideologycan help explain the level of expenditures on interest payment of subnational debt in India. The core empirical finding is that significant increases in expenditures on the debt occur the year in which a state assembly election is held in India.
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页码:47 / 65
页数:19
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