Evolutionary game theory: ESS, convergence stability, and NIS

被引:0
|
作者
Apaloo, Joseph [1 ]
Brown, Joel S. [2 ]
Vincent, Thomas L. [3 ]
机构
[1] St Francis Xavier Univ, Dept Math Stat & Comp Sci, Antigonish, NS B2G 2W5, Canada
[2] Univ Illinois, Dept Biol Sci, Chicago, IL 60680 USA
[3] Univ Arizona, Dept Aerosp & Mech Engn, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
关键词
adaptive landscape; convergence stability; Darwinian dynamics; evolutionary game stabilities; evolutionarily stable strategy; neighbourhood invader strategy; strategy dynamics; MODIFIER THEORY; MENDELIAN SEGREGATION; GENETIC STABILITY; KIN SELECTION; SEX-RATIO; RECOMBINATION; MODELS; COEVOLUTION; STRATEGIES; PRINCIPLE;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
Question: How are the three main stability concepts from evolutionary game theory evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), convergence stability, and neighbourhood invader strategy (NIS) - related to each other? Do they form a basis for the many other definitions proposed in the literature? Mathematical methods: Ecological and evolutionary dynamics of population sizes and heritable strategies respectively, and adaptive and NIS landscapes. Results: Only six of the eight combinations of ESS, convergence stability, and NIS are possible. An ESS that is NIS must also be convergence stable; and a non-ESS, non-NIS cannot be convergence stable. A simple example shows how a single model can easily generate solutions with all six combinations of stability properties and explains in part the proliferation of jargon, terminology, and apparent complexity that has appeared in the literature. A tabulation of most of the evolutionary stability acronyms, definitions, and terminologies is provided for comparison. Key conclusions: The tabulated list of definitions related to evolutionary stability are variants or combinations of the three main stability concepts.
引用
收藏
页码:489 / 515
页数:27
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