Anti‐
corruption;
Mergers and acquisitions;
Ownership structure;
Political connections;
Property right law;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
PERFORMANCE EVIDENCE;
FIRM PERFORMANCE;
STATE OWNERSHIP;
MERGER ACTIVITY;
RETURNS;
MARKET;
INSTITUTIONS;
TAKEOVERS;
PAYMENT;
D O I:
10.1111/acfi.12302
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This study examines the impact that political connections have on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) performance and the decisions of Chinese listed firms. We find that political connections destroy (create) value in SOEs (non-SOEs). Our findings show that connected SOEs are more likely to acquire local targets, especially when the local unemployment rate is high and when the firms are controlled by the local government, and they are less likely to conduct vertical mergers. M&A decisions of connected non-SOEs are less influenced by the government; instead, political connections in non-SOEs help bidders to integrate vertically and obtain external financing support.
机构:
Sun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Coll, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R ChinaSun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Coll, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
Cao, Xiaping
Pan, Xiaofei
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h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Wollongong, Sch Accounting Econ & Finance, Wollongong, NSW 2522, AustraliaSun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Coll, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
Pan, Xiaofei
Qian, Meijun
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机构:
Australian Natl Univ, Res Sch Finance Actuarial Studies & Stat, Canberra, ACT 0200, AustraliaSun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Coll, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
Qian, Meijun
Tian, Gary Gang
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Macquarie Univ, Dept Appl Finance & Actuarial Studies, N Ryde, NSW 2109, AustraliaSun Yat Sen Univ, Lingnan Coll, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China