Non-binding minimum taxes may foster tax competition

被引：11
|
作者：
Konrad, Kai A. [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Free Univ Berlin, Dept Econ, D-1000 Berlin, Germany
[2] Social Sci Res Ctr Berlin WZB, Berlin, Germany
来源：
ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2009年 / 102卷 / 02期
关键词：
Tax competition; Minimum tax; Tax coordination; Stackelberg; COORDINATION; COUNTRIES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.econlet.2008.11.028
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In a Stackelberg framework of capital income taxation it is shown that imposing a minimum tax rate that is lower than all countries' equilibrium tax rates in the unconstrained non-cooperative equilibrium may reduce equilibrium tax rates in all countries. (c) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：109 / 111
页数：3
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