Executive compensation and earnings management under moral hazard

被引：12
|
作者：
Sun, Bo [1 ]
机构：
[1] Peking Univ, Guanghua Sch Management, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL | 2014年 / 41卷
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
Earnings management; Executive compensation; Optimal contract; Corporate governance; MANIPULATION; CONTRACTS;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jedc.2014.02.004
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
This paper analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. We show that an increase in the possibility of manipulation actually calls for executive pay to be more responsive to reported performance. In addition, regulatory reforms that increase the cost involved in manipulation may lead to reduced pay-for-performance sensitivities. The time-series and cross-sectional variations of executive compensation lend support to our model. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：276 / 290
页数：15
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