Extremism in revolutionary movements

被引:10
|
作者
Shadmehr, Mehdi [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Miami, Sch Business, Dept Econ, Coral Gable, FL 33146 USA
[2] Princeton Univ, Dept Polit, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
关键词
Revolution; Revolutionary entrepreneurs; Extremism; Repression; Repression backlash; Competition; MONOTONE COMPARATIVE STATICS; GLOBAL GAMES; COLLECTIVE ACTION; POPULAR PROTEST; REGIME CHANGE; REPRESSION; MODEL; COORDINATION; INSTITUTIONS; INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.003
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A revolutionary entrepreneur strategically chooses the revolutionary agenda to maximize the likelihood of revolution. Citizens have different preferences and can contribute varying degrees of support. We show: (1) Extremists exert a disproportionate influence over the revolutionary agenda; (2) Depending on the structure of repression, more severe repression can moderate or radicalize the revolutionary agenda. Specifically, increases in the "minimum punishment" (marginal cost of revolutionary effort at its minimum) radicalize the revolutionary agenda. This presents the elite with a tradeoff between extreme but unlikely revolutions and moderate but likely ones. (3) Competition between revolutionary entrepreneurs can radicalize the revolutionary agenda. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:97 / 121
页数:25
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