Multi-stage sequential all-pay auctions

被引：27
|
作者：
Segev, Ella [1 ]
Sela, Aner [2 ]
机构：
[1] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Ind Engn & Management, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel
[2] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel
来源：
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 2014年 / 70卷
关键词：
Sequential contests; All-pay auctions; DISSIPATION; COMPETITION; CONTESTS; PRIZES;
D O I：
10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.06.006
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We study multi-stage sequential all-pay contests (auctions) where heterogeneous contestants are privately informed about a parameter (ability) that affects their cost of effort. We characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium of these contests and analyze the effect of the number of contestants and their types on the contestants' expected highest effort. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：371 / 382
页数：12
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