Do Audit Clients Successfully Engage in Opinion Shopping? Partner-Level Evidence

被引:164
作者
Chen, Feng [1 ,2 ]
Peng, Songlan [3 ]
Xue, Shuang [4 ]
Yang, Zhifeng [5 ]
Ye, Feiteng [6 ]
机构
[1] Univ Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 1A1, Canada
[2] Univ Missouri, Columbia, MO 65211 USA
[3] York Univ, N York, ON M3J 1P3, Canada
[4] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China
[5] City Univ Hong Kong, Hong Kong, Peoples R China
[6] Shanghai Lixin Univ Commerce, Shanghai, Peoples R China
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
opinion shopping; partner switch; audit quality; individual auditor; INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT; INDUSTRY EXPERTISE; QUALITY; CHINA; OFFICE; TENURE; COSTS; FIRM;
D O I
10.1111/1475-679X.12097
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This study investigates whether companies engage in audit opinion shopping activities by exerting influence over an audit firm's decision to switch the engagement partner (partner-level opinion shopping) in the Chinese setting, where the identities of engagement partners are publicly disclosed. Adopting the empirical framework developed by Lennox [2000], we show evidence that companies successfully engage in partner-level opinion shopping. Further, partner-level opinion shopping is more likely to be successful if a company is economically important to an audit firm, and it is less likely to be successful if the audit firm is formed as a partnership rather than a corporation. We also find that companies successfully engaging in partner-level opinion shopping exhibit significantly lower earnings quality. Finally, we directly compare audit records between incoming and outgoing partners and find that, for companies that successfully improve audit opinions after partner switching, incoming partners have a significantly higher propensity to issue clean opinions than their outgoing counterparts.
引用
收藏
页码:79 / 112
页数:34
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