Work incentives and household insurance: Sequential contracting with altruistic individuals and moral hazard

被引:0
|
作者
Aubert, C [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Paris 09, Dept Econ Appl, F-75016 Paris, France
关键词
incentives; altruism; moral hazard;
D O I
10.1016/j.econlet.2006.01.028
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Two agents sequentially contracts with different principals under moral hazard. If agents care for one another, the second principal gains by insuring them over first wages. Even with independent tasks, the first principal must offer riskier payments to induce effort. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:82 / 88
页数:7
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