Are Property Rights Ever Basic Human Rights?

被引:4
作者
Cruft, Rowan [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Stirling, Dept Philosophy, Stirling FK9 4LA, Scotland
关键词
property rights; human rights; individualism;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-856X.2009.00398.x
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Stealing from someone is not as bad as torturing, killing or raping them. But is the difference between theft and these fundamental violations simply a difference in degree (of severity)? I begin this article by outlining several ways in which the moral grounds for property rights differ in kind from those for basic human rights, differences that underpin and explain the difference in severity. I go on to ask whether, despite these differences, there might be some property rights that we should still classify as basic human rights.
引用
收藏
页码:142 / 154
页数:13
相关论文
共 26 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], LEGALIZATION HUMAN R
[2]  
[Anonymous], 1994, ETHICS PUBLIC DOMAIN
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2006, FRONTIERS JUSTICE
[4]  
Becker LawrenceC., 1977, PROPERTY RIGHTS PHIL
[5]  
Caney Simon., 2006, JUSTICE BORDERS
[6]  
Cruft R, 2004, LAW PHILOS, V23, P347
[7]  
CRUFT R, J MORAL PHI IN PRESS
[8]  
Cruft Rowan., 2006, Utilitas, V18, P154
[9]   The value of ownership [J].
Dan-Cohen, M .
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, 2001, 9 (04) :404-434
[10]  
Dworkin Ronald., 2002, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE