Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?

被引:168
作者
Cinyabuguma, Matthias
Page, Talbot
Putterman, Louis [1 ]
机构
[1] Brown Univ, Dept Econ, Providence, RI 02912 USA
[2] Univ Maryland Baltimore Cty, Dept Econ, Baltimore, MD USA
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
public goods; collective action; experiment; punishment;
D O I
10.1007/s10683-006-9127-z
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Recent experiments have shown that voluntary punishment of free riders can increase contributions, mitigating the free-rider problem. But frequently punishers punish high contributors, creating "perverse" incentives which can undermine the benefits of voluntary punishment. In our experiment, allowing punishment of punishing behaviors reduces punishment of high contributors, but gives rise to efficiency-reducing second-order "perverse" punishment. On balance, efficiency and contributions are slightly but not significantly enhanced.
引用
收藏
页码:265 / 279
页数:15
相关论文
共 19 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], EFFECT REWARDS SANCT
[2]   AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO NORMS [J].
AXELROD, R .
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, 1986, 80 (04) :1095-1111
[3]   Communication and punishment in voluntary contribution experiments [J].
Bochet, O ;
Page, T ;
Putterman, L .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2006, 60 (01) :11-26
[4]  
CARPENTER J, 2002, 29 MIDDL COLL DEP EC
[5]  
Cinyabuguma M, 2004, 200412 BROWN U DEP E
[6]  
Davis Douglas D., 1993, EXP ECON
[7]  
ERTAN A, 2005, 200513 BROWN U DEP E
[8]   Third-party punishment and social norms [J].
Fehr, E ;
Fischbacher, U .
EVOLUTION AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR, 2004, 25 (02) :63-87
[9]   Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments [J].
Fehr, E ;
Gächter, S .
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 2000, 90 (04) :980-994
[10]   Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation [J].
Henrich, J .
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2004, 53 (01) :3-35