Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?

被引：168

作者：

Cinyabuguma, Matthias

Page, Talbot

Putterman, Louis ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Brown Univ, Dept Econ, Providence, RI 02912 USA

[2] Univ Maryland Baltimore Cty, Dept Econ, Baltimore, MD USA

来源：

EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS | 2006年 / 9卷 / 03期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

public goods; collective action; experiment; punishment;

D O I：

10.1007/s10683-006-9127-z

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Recent experiments have shown that voluntary punishment of free riders can increase contributions, mitigating the free-rider problem. But frequently punishers punish high contributors, creating "perverse" incentives which can undermine the benefits of voluntary punishment. In our experiment, allowing punishment of punishing behaviors reduces punishment of high contributors, but gives rise to efficiency-reducing second-order "perverse" punishment. On balance, efficiency and contributions are slightly but not significantly enhanced.

引用

页码：265 / 279

页数：15

共 19 条

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