Aid and the Soft Budget Constraint

被引:2
|
作者
Janus, Thorsten [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Wyoming, Coll Business, Dept 3985, Laramie, WY 82071 USA
关键词
FOREIGN-AID; CREDIT;
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-9361.2008.00485.x
中图分类号
F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];
学科分类号
0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;
摘要
The author applies the theory of the soft budget constraint to explain some stylized facts regarding the outcomes and practice of international aid, including ineffectiveness, white elephants, and volatility. The soft budget constraint can also make aid counterproductive. Nonetheless, actual aid institutions may be constrained optimal responses to soft budgets and commonly suggested reforms such as improved donor coordination in aid, focus on fewer countries and projects, and less volatility of aid may lower the effectiveness of aid. The soft budget is also consistent with conservative project selection and the recent focus on "ownership.".
引用
收藏
页码:264 / 275
页数:12
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