Setting a Good Example? The Effect of Leader and Peer Behavior on Corruption among Indonesian Senior Civil Servants

Standard anticorruption interventions consist of intensified monitoring and sanctioning. Rooted in principal-agent theory, these interventions are based on the assumption that corrupt acts follow a rational cost-benefit calculation by gain-seeking individuals. Given their mixed results, however, these interventions require closer scrutiny. Building on goal-framing theory, the authors argue that rule compliance requires a salient normative goal frame, since monitoring can never be perfect. Being inherently brittle, it needs constant reinforcement through external cues operating alongside formal monitoring and sanctioning. Leaders and peers setting a good example can provide such cues. In line with this hypothesis, analysis of multilevel repeated measures data from a vignette study of 580 Indonesian senior civil servants shows that the perceived likelihood of a hypothetical civil servant accepting a bribe is lowest when monitoring and sanctioning are strong and when leaders and peers are known to have refused bribes in the past.