Moral hazard effects of supplemental private health insurance in Korea

被引:15
|
作者
Ko, Hansoo [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] NYU, Wagner Grad Sch Publ Serv, 295 Lafayette St Room3034, New York, NY 10012 USA
[2] Univ Illinois, Sch Publ Hlth, Chicago, IL 60607 USA
关键词
Moral hazard; Favorable selection; Private health insurance; MEDIGAP INSURANCE; ADVANTAGEOUS SELECTION; FAVORABLE SELECTION; ADVERSE SELECTION; CARE; DEMAND; ECONOMICS; MARKETS; WELFARE; ACCESS;
D O I
10.1016/j.socscimed.2020.113325
中图分类号
R1 [预防医学、卫生学];
学科分类号
1004 ; 120402 ;
摘要
Supplemental private health insurance has gained popularity despite having a mandatory social health insurance program in Korea. Private insurance supplements the social insurance program by covering co pays and services not covered by social insurance. Using longitudinal microdata from the 2008-2014 Korea Health Panel, this study finds evidence of favorable selection into supplemental private insurance. Results show that supplemental private insurance increases outpatient and hospitalization utilization. Private health insurance generates welfare benefits especially among the elderly and low-income individuals, though the coverage rate for these groups is low.
引用
收藏
页数:11
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