Japanese voluntary environmental agreements: Bargaining power and reciprocity as contributors to effectiveness

被引:20
|
作者
Welch, EW
Hibiki, A
机构
[1] Univ Illinois, Coll Urban Planning & Publ Affairs, Grad Sch Publ Affairs, Chicago, IL 60607 USA
[2] Natl Inst Environm Studies, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 3050053, Japan
[3] Tokyo Inst Technol, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 3050053, Japan
关键词
D O I
10.1023/A:1021344508225
中图分类号
C93 [管理学]; D035 [国家行政管理]; D523 [行政管理]; D63 [国家行政管理];
学科分类号
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ; 1204 ; 120401 ;
摘要
Theoretical and empirical research on voluntarism has focused primarily on U. S. and European examples, but has generally failed to consider the Japanese system of voluntary environmental agreements. Nevertheless, Japanese VEAs are one of the world's oldest experiments in voluntary policy; careful analysis of the characteristics and contexts may improve understanding about the critical factors associated with effective voluntary policy. This paper reviews the extant literature on voluntarism focusing specifically on the bargaining context within which agreements are negotiated. It details three factors that contribute to the effectiveness of voluntary policy generally: regulatory bargaining power, non-regulatory bargaining power and reciprocity. The paper then provides a brief but detailed analysis of the development of voluntary agreements in Japan. Comparisons with voluntary policies in the U.S. and Europe are included. Findings indicate similarities and some significant differences between the Japanese system and other national systems of voluntary policy. Conclusions discuss implications for theory and policy.
引用
收藏
页码:401 / 424
页数:24
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