Controlling shareholders' value, long-run firm value and short-term performance

被引:21
|
作者
Kang, Hyung Cheol [1 ]
Anderson, Robert M. [2 ]
Eom, Kyong Shik [2 ]
Kang, Sang Koo [3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Seoul, Coll Business Adm, 163 Seoulsiripdae Ro, Seoul 02504, South Korea
[2] Univ Calif Berkeley, Ctr Risk Management Res, Dept Econ, 530 Evans Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA
[3] Korea Univ, Asian Inst Corp Governance, Business Sch, 1,5 Ga, Seoul 02841, South Korea
关键词
Controlling shareholders' value (CSV); Business group; Cash flow rights (CFR); Ownership structure; Chaebol; Limited attention; KOREAN BUSINESS GROUPS; OWNERSHIP; EXPROPRIATION; FAMILY; CORPORATIONS; MARKETS; STOCK;
D O I
10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.01.013
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We propose a new determinant of firm value within a business group: controlling shareholders' value (CSV), the value of controlling shareholders' stake in an affiliate divided by their stake in all affiliates. We posit that controlling shareholders focus attention on the high-CSV affiliates. Using data on Korean family-controlled business groups, we find that CSV has greater explanatory power for firm performance than traditional cash flow rights (CFR). We also find that, among affiliates with non-family CEOs, higher CSV is associated with higher Tobin's Q. and lower EBITDA, indicating that controlling shareholders and non-family CEO have successfully addressed their principal-agent problem. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:340 / 353
页数:14
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