On the theory of reference-dependent preferences

被引:103
|
作者
Munro, A [1 ]
Sugden, R [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ E Anglia, Sch Econ & Social Studies, Norwich NR4 7TJ, Norfolk, England
基金
英国经济与社会研究理事会;
关键词
status quo bias; loss aversion; reference-dependence; prospect theory;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00033-1
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
A theory is proposed in which preferences are conditional on reference points. It is related to Tversky and Kahneman's reference-dependent preference theory, but is simpler and deviates less from conventional consumer theory. Preferences conditional on any given reference point satisfy conventional assumptions. Apart from a continuity condition, the only additional restriction is to rule out cycles of pairwise choice. The theory is consistent with observations of status quo bias and related effects. Reference points are treated as subject to change during the course of trade. The implications of endogeneity of reference points for behaviour in markets are investigated. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:407 / 428
页数:22
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