Debt renegotiation with collateral under asymmetric information

被引：0
|
作者：
Janda, K [1 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Iowa, Dept Econ, Iowa City, IA 52242 USA
来源：
FINANCE A UVER | 2002年 / 52卷 / 11期
关键词：
adverse selection; costly state verification; collateral; credit;
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This paper analyzes the adverse-selection model of the financing of high-risk investment projects with a possibility of utilizing collateralized debt contracts. Due to the costly verification of the project outcomes, debt renegotiation becomes a possibility. The author shows that debt renegotiation increases the welfare and does not preclude-the use of collateral as a screening device.
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页码：634 / 635
页数：2
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