Reason and Moral Motivation in Moz

Based on the observation that ancient Chinese thinkers formulated their conception of logic and agency mainly around the concept of bian (discrimination), Chris Fraser argues that (1) ancient Chinese thinkers had no concept of sentence or proposition, (2) they did not engage in logical argumentation in its proper sense, and (3) reason or rationality was not highly valued in ancient China for normative evaluation of actions. However, the text of the Moz (sic)offspring contains strong pieces of evidence against these claims, and I argue that the opposite is clearly the case in Moz Then, I move on to apply the metaethical idea of judgment internalism-the idea that there is an "internal" or conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation-to some passages from the Moz and argue that Moz is best interpreted as a flexible internalist who is willing to incorporate an externalist idea into his system of thought.