Study of the ex-post moral hazard of laboratory services in Iran

被引:0
|
作者
Otobideh, Seyed Alireza [1 ]
Yusefzadeh, Hasan [1 ]
Aghlmand, Siamak [1 ]
Alinia, Cyrus [1 ]
机构
[1] Urmia Univ Med Sci, Sch Publ Hlth, Dept Hlth Management & Econ, Orumiyeh, Iran
来源
HEALTH POLICY OPEN | 2021年 / 2卷
关键词
Ex -post moral hazard; Inpatient services; Laboratory services; Insurance; Health system; Iran; HEALTH-INSURANCE; ADVERSE SELECTION; 4; DECADES; CARE; DEMAND; COVERAGE; REFORMS; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.hpopen.2021.100031
中图分类号
R19 [保健组织与事业(卫生事业管理)];
学科分类号
摘要
The basic health insurances cover more than 90% of the Iranian population but have failed to organize the referral system and created favorable conditions for the ex-post moral hazard. Five hundred fifty people older than 15 years were randomly selected in five districts of Urmia city and completed the questionnaire to study the existence of Ex-post moral hazard in utilizing the high-consumption laboratory services (blood and urine tests). In this population-based cross-sectional study, utilization of the services in two groups of insured and uninsured people was analyzed using odds ratio statistics and logistic regression. The findings showed that being female (OR: 2.38) and having health insurance (OR: 2.03) played a very determinative role in obtaining selected laboratory services, and about 9% of the laboratory services provided were caused by ex-post moral hazard. The predicted size of ex-post moral hazard is significant, so its control requires modifying health insurance policies in determining the premium and cost-sharing schemes and controlling physicians' behavior as the principal applicants for these services.
引用
收藏
页数:8
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Ex-post moral hazard in prevented planting
    Kim, Taehoo
    Kim, Man-Keun
    AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 2018, 49 (06) : 671 - 680
  • [2] To wait or to pay for medical treatment? Restraining ex-post moral hazard in health insurance
    Felder, Stefan
    JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 2008, 27 (06) : 1418 - 1422
  • [3] Ex-post moral hazard in the health insurance market: empirical evidence from German data
    Thoennes, Stefanie
    EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS, 2019, 20 (09): : 1317 - 1333
  • [4] Ex-post moral hazard in the health insurance market: empirical evidence from German data
    Stefanie Thönnes
    The European Journal of Health Economics, 2019, 20 : 1317 - 1333
  • [5] Competitive procurement with ex post moral hazard
    Chakraborty, Indranil
    Khalil, Fahad
    Lawarree, Jacques
    RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 2021, 52 (01): : 179 - 206
  • [6] EX-POST EFFICIENCY AND EX-POST WELFARE - SOME FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
    MILNE, F
    SHEFRIN, HM
    ECONOMICA, 1988, 55 (217) : 63 - 79
  • [7] Forum shopping for ex-post gas-balancing services
    Keyaerts, Nico
    D'haeseleer, William
    ENERGY POLICY, 2014, 67 : 209 - 221
  • [8] Ex Post Moral Hazard and Bayesian Learning in Insurance
    Ludkovski, Michael
    Young, Virginia R.
    JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, 2010, 77 (04) : 829 - 856
  • [9] Ex Post Moral Hazard in Private Health Insurance
    Aistov, Andrey V.
    Aleksandrova, Ekaterina A.
    EKONOMICHESKAYA POLITIKA, 2018, 13 (03): : 148 - 181
  • [10] EX-POST INFORMATION IN AUCTIONS
    RILEY, JG
    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1988, 55 (03): : 409 - 429