Intergovernmental competition for donations: The case of the Furusato Nozei program in Japan

被引:1
|
作者
Fukasawa, Eiji [1 ]
Fukasawa, Takeshi [2 ]
Ogawa, Hikaru [2 ]
机构
[1] Natl Diet Lib, Chiyoda Ku, 1-10-1 Nagatacho, Tokyo 1008924, Japan
[2] Univ Tokyo, Bunkyo Ku, 7-3-1 Hongo, Tokyo 1130033, Japan
关键词
Interregional fiscal competition; Donation; Efficiency; MODELS;
D O I
10.1016/j.asieco.2020.101178
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper shows that municipalities compete excessively for donations under a unique program called Furusato Nozei (Tax payment to hometown) in Japan. Under the program, people make donations to their favorite municipalities and municipalities that have received donations give reciprocal gifts in return. This causes governments to compete for donations by setting "return rates" - the value of a gift as a percentage of the donation received. Our estimates show that, in the most likely case, this competition reduces net revenue by at least 7.5% compared to when the municipalities do not compete for donations. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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页数:14
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