An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Contractor's Green Construction Behavior with Government Supervision and WeMedia's Influence

被引:6
|
作者
Zhang, Yuebin [1 ]
Yi, Xin [1 ]
Qiu, Hui [2 ]
Chen, Jingchuan [1 ]
机构
[1] Cent South Univ Forestry & Technol, Sch Civil Engn, Changsha 410000, Hunan, Peoples R China
[2] Cent South Univ Forestry & Technol, Sch Landscape Architecture, Changsha 410000, Hunan, Peoples R China
关键词
Construction industry - Social aspects - System stability;
D O I
10.1155/2022/6722223
中图分类号
T [工业技术];
学科分类号
08 ;
摘要
The promotion of green construction is an important approach to achieve high-quality and sustainable development of China's construction industry. In China, the government supervises contractors' green construction behavior. However, due to factors such as high cost and immature construction technology, the contractor often does not have a strong interest to adopt green construction behavior. An evolutionary game model is constructed based on the interactive relationship between government and contractor under bounded rationality conditions. As the best way for public opinion to function, WeMedia mechanism is considered in the evolutionary game model from the perspective of public participation. The evolutionary game process of the two players is simulated by system dynamics. The results show that without the influence of WeMedia, the stability of the system evolution depends on two factors. One is the government's penalty for contractor's nongreen construction behavior and the other is government's supervision performance brought from contractor's green construction behavior. With the influence of WeMedia, when WeMedia's willingness to positively propagandize the contractor's green construction behavior strengthens, it can significantly promote the system to converge to the ideal stable strategy. While WeMedia's capability to negatively expose the contractor's nongreen construction behavior strengthens, it can also significantly promote the system to converge to the ideal stable strategy. Even if the government takes excessive penalties for the contractor's nongreen construction behavior, the system can still converge to the ideal stable strategy, by adjusting the willingness of propaganda or the capability of exposure from WeMedia reasonably. With the influence of WeMedia in the green construction supervision game, this study analyzes how the positive propaganda and negative exposure of WeMedia influence the strategic choice of the game between the two parties, to provide suggestions on how the government can efficiently use the WeMedia to promote contractor's green construction behavior.
引用
收藏
页数:12
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