Cost-benefit default principles

被引:72
作者
Sunstein, CR [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Sch Law, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[2] Univ Chicago, Dept Polit Sci, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
关键词
D O I
10.2307/1290477
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
Courts should be reluctant to apply the literal terms of a statute to mandate pointless expenditures of effort.... Unless Congress has been extraordinarily rigid, there is likely a basis for an implication of de minimis authority to provide exemption when the burdens of regulation yield a gain of trivial or no value.(1) It seems bizarre that a statute intended to improve human health would... lock the agency into looking at only one half of a substance's health effects in determining the maximum level for that (2) substance. [I]t is only where there is "clear congressional intent to preclude consideration of cost" that we find agencies barred from considering Costs.(3) In order better to achieve regulatory goals - for example, to allocate resources so that they save more lives or produce a cleaner environment - regulators must often take account of all of a proposed regulation's adverse effects, at least where those effects clearly threaten serious and disproportionate public harm. Hence, I believe that, other things being equal, we should read silences or ambiguities in the language of regulatory statutes as permitting, not forbidding, this type of rational regulation.(4) The rule-implicit valuation of a life is high - about $4 million - but not so astronomical, certainly by regulatory standards, as to call the rationality of the rule seriously into question, especially when we consider that neither Hepatitis B nor AIDS is a disease of old people. These diseases are no respecters of youth; they cut off people in their working years, and thus in their prime, and it is natural to set a high value on the lost years.(5).
引用
收藏
页码:1651 / 1723
页数:73
相关论文
共 80 条
[1]  
Ackerman Bruce, 1981, CLEAN COAL DIRTY AIR
[2]  
Ackerman Bruce A., 1988, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, V13, P171
[3]   Rethinking cost-benefit analysis [J].
Adler, MD ;
Posner, EA .
YALE LAW JOURNAL, 1999, 109 (02) :165-+
[4]   Implementing cost-benefit analysis when preferences are distorted [J].
Adler, MD ;
Posner, EA .
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES, 2000, 29 (02) :1105-1147
[5]  
ANDERSON E, 1993, VALUE ETHIS EC
[6]  
Anderson Elizabeth., 1993, VALUE ETHICS EC
[7]  
[Anonymous], MARKETS CLEAN AIR
[8]  
[Anonymous], J LEGAL STUDIES
[9]  
[Anonymous], 1992, FATAL TRADEOFFS
[10]  
[Anonymous], 1993, Fed. RegSept. 30,, V58, P51735