Rationality in international relations

被引:74
作者
Kahler, M [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Calif San Diego, Grad Sch Int Relat & Pacific Studies, San Diego, CA 92103 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1162/002081898550680
中图分类号
D81 [国际关系];
学科分类号
030207 ;
摘要
Rationalist models have faced four persistent sets of critics as the research program of international relations has evolved. Under neorealism's structural constraints of international competition and selection, agents' rationality may appear superfluous. Psychological critics have presented neither a single theoretical alternative to rational choice nor contingent hypotheses that specify when psychological distortions of rational decision making are most likely. Both rational choice and psychological approaches must construct models of action for social entities that aggregate individuals. The rationality and individualism of beliefs is questioned by theorists who stress culture, identity, and norms as independent sources of action. Careful stipulation of scope, acknowledgment of methodological shortcomings, and precise definition of differences can serve to bridge the theoretical divide between rational choice models and their critics. Problem-centered research provides a level playing field on which theoretical competition can be established.
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收藏
页码:919 / +
页数:24
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