Ownership, Top Executive's Pay Gap and Firm Performance

被引:0
|
作者
Lu, Haifan [1 ]
机构
[1] Guangdong Univ Foreign Studies, Coll Finance & Econ, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China
关键词
ownership; pay gap; firm performance;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Using the data of Chinese listed firms during 2005-2008, this paper investigates the incentive function of the top executive's pay gap. The results are: first, the kind of ownership affects pay gap. In state-owned companies, the pay gap is smaller. Second, the performance first increases and then decreases when the pay gap keeps increasing. The kind of ownership affects the point of inflection. In state-owned companies, the point of inflection is smaller.
引用
收藏
页码:141 / 144
页数:4
相关论文
共 7 条
  • [1] THE FAIR WAGE-EFFORT HYPOTHESIS AND UNEMPLOYMENT
    AKERLOF, GA
    YELLEN, YL
    [J]. QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1990, 105 (02): : 255 - 283
  • [2] Top management team coordination needs and the CEO pay gap: A competitive test of economic and behavioral views
    Henderson, AD
    Fredrickson, JW
    [J]. ACADEMY OF MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, 2001, 44 (01): : 96 - 117
  • [3] RANK-ORDER TOURNAMENTS AS OPTIMUM LABOR CONTRACTS
    LAZEAR, EP
    ROSEN, S
    [J]. JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1981, 89 (05) : 841 - 864
  • [4] LI ZQ, 2000, ACCOUNTING RES, P24
  • [5] CEO COMPENSATION AS TOURNAMENT AND SOCIAL-COMPARISON - A TALE OF 2 THEORIES
    OREILLY, CA
    MAIN, BG
    CRYSTAL, GS
    [J]. ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCE QUARTERLY, 1988, 33 (02) : 257 - 274
  • [6] Siegel PA, 1996, ADV STRATEG MANAG, V13, P91
  • [7] Xu Xiaodong, 2003, EC RES J