PRIVACY REGULATION AND MARKET STRUCTURE

被引：101

作者：

Campbell, James ^{[1
]}

Goldfarb, Avi ^{[1
,2
]}

Tucker, Catherine ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada

[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA

[3] MIT, MIT Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA

来源：

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY | 2015年 / 24卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

ADVERTISING RESTRICTIONS; ECONOMICS; TECHNOLOGY; PROTECTION;

D O I：

10.1111/jems.12079

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper models how regulatory attempts to protect the privacy of consumers' data affect the competitive structure of data-intensive industries. Our results suggest that the commonly used consent-based approach may disproportionately benefit firms that offer a larger scope of services. Therefore, though privacy regulation imposes costs on all firms, it is small firms and new firms that are most adversely affected. We then show that this negative effect will be particularly severe for goods where the price mechanism does not mediate the effect, such as the advertising-supported Internet.

引用

页码：47 / 73

页数：27

共 33 条

[1] Conditioning prices on purchase history [J].