Imperfect competition and reputational commitment

被引：30

作者：

Bar-Isaac, H ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] NYU, Stern Sch Business, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10012 USA

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 2005年 / 89卷 / 02期

关键词：

quality; competition; self-enforcing commitment;

D O I：

10.1016/j.econlet.2005.05.022

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

Competition can both aid and hinder reputational commitments for quality. These are self-sustaining depending on future profits after maintaining or deviating from the commitment, and on current costs of sustaining it. Competition can affect these three elements at different rates. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved.

引用

页码：167 / 173

页数：7

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