Moral Inquiry Beyond Objectivism and Subjectivism

被引:2
|
作者
Pueyo-Ibanez, Belen [1 ]
机构
[1] Emory Univ, Atlanta, GA 30322 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY | 2021年 / 35卷 / 02期
关键词
moral inquiry; objectivism; subjectivism; pragmatism; John Dewey;
D O I
10.5325/jspecphil.35.2.0165
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
There is a shared feeling among those familiar with pragmatism that, if applied in practice, the teachings of Peirce, James, Dewey, and their heirs could prove extraordinarily helpful in our current uncertain times-times of persistent moral disagreements and almost irreparable social conflicts. But to what extent is this feeling justified? What is the nature of these infelicitous circumstances? And, what makes pragmatism such a suitable approach? In this article, I claim that the main reason behind the ineffectiveness with which we have traditionally addressed our differences is the uncritical acceptance and enactment of a pernicious dichotomy between objectivism and subjectivism. As I argue, it is pragmatist philosophers who most clearly understood the urgency to find an alternative to these extreme positions and who most successfully accomplished this task; it is to them, I claim, we must now turn if we are to more effectively address our disagreements and conflicts.
引用
收藏
页码:165 / 175
页数:11
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