The paradoxes of permission an action based solution

被引：3
|
作者：
Gabbay, Dov [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Gammaitoni, Loic [4 ]
Sun, Xin [3 ]
机构：
[1] Bar Ilan Univ, Dept Comp Sci, IL-52100 Ramat Gan, Israel
[2] Kings Coll London, Dept Informat, London WC2R 2LS, England
[3] Univ Luxembourg, Fac Sci Technol & Commun, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
[4] Univ Luxembourg, Lab Adv Software Syst LASSY, Luxembourg, Luxembourg
来源：
JOURNAL OF APPLIED LOGIC | 2014年 / 12卷 / 02期
关键词：
Deontic logic permission; Actions; Contrary to duty obligations; LOGIC;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jal.2014.01.003
中图分类号：
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号：
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要：
The aim of this article is to construct a deontic logic in which the free choice postulate allow (Ross, 1941) [11] would be consistent and all the implausible result mentioned in (Hanson, in press) [5] will be blocked. To achieve this we first developed a new theory of action. Then we build a new deontic logic in which the deontic action operator and the deontic proposition operator are explicitly distinguished. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码：179 / 191
页数：13
相关论文
共 50 条
12345