Remarks on fodor on having concepts

被引：5

作者：

Weiskopf, DA

Bechtel, W

机构：

[1] Univ S Florida, Dept Philosophy, Tampa, FL 33620 USA

[2] Univ Calif San Diego, Dept Philosophy, San Diego, CA 92103 USA

来源：

MIND & LANGUAGE | 2004年 / 19卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1111/j.1468-0017.2004.00246.x

中图分类号：

H0 [语言学];

学科分类号：

030303 ; 0501 ; 050102 ;

摘要：

Fodor offers a novel argument against Bare-bones Concept Pragmatism (BCP). He alleges that there are two circularities in BCP's account of concept possession: a circularity in explaining concept possession in terms of the capacity to sort; and a circularity in explaining concept possession in terms of the capacity to draw inferences. We argue that neither of these circles is real.

引用

页码：48 / 56

页数：9