Do External Grants to District Governments Discourage Own Revenue Generation? A Look at Local Public Finance Dynamics in Ghana

被引：38

作者：

Mogues, Tewodaj ^{[1
]}

Benin, Samuel ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Int Food Policy Res Inst, Washington, DC 20036 USA

[2] Int Food Policy Res Inst, Davis, CA USA

来源：

WORLD DEVELOPMENT | 2012年 / 40卷 / 05期

关键词：

decentralization; local public finance; internally generated revenues; intergovernmental transfers; Africa; Ghana; PANEL-DATA; EXPENDITURES NEXUS; PARTY COMPETITION; TAX; DECENTRALIZATION; SPECIFICATION; POLITICS; TAXATION; TESTS;

D O I：

10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.12.001

中图分类号：

F0 [经济学]; F1 [世界各国经济概况、经济史、经济地理]; C [社会科学总论];

学科分类号：

0201 ; 020105 ; 03 ; 0303 ;

摘要：

Using rich panel data on all of Ghana's districts' local public finances over 11 years, this paper investigates the way that intergovernmental and other transfers to local governments affect local governments' incentives to collect internally generated revenues and funds (IGF). We find that despite an incentive scheme built into one of the major intergovernmental grants, the flow of all grants taken together discourages, rather than encourages, IGF. This is reflected both in the depressing effect of transfers on IGF levels, as well as on IGF growth. (c) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

引用

页码：1054 / 1067

页数：14