New Foundations for Imperative Logic: Pure Imperative Inference

Imperatives cannot be true, but they can be obeyed or binding 'Surrender!' is obeyed if you surrender and is binding if you have a reason to surrender. A pure declarative argument - whose premisses and conclusion are declaratives is valid exactly if, necessarily, its conclusion is true if the conjunction of its premisses is true; similarly, I suggest, a pure imperative argument - whose premisses and conclusion are imperatives - is obedience-valid (alternatively: bindingness-valid) exactly if, necessarily, its conclusion is obeyed (alternatively: binding) if the conjunction of its premisses is. I argue that there are two kinds of bindingness, and that a vacillation between two corresponding variants of bindingness-validity largely explains conflicting intuitions concerning the validity of some pure imperative arguments. I prove that for each of those two variants of bindingness-validity there is an equivalent variant of obedience-validity. Finally, I address alternative accounts of pure imperative inference.